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Tax Aspects of Jury Valuation of
Future Earnings
John J. Kennett*
W HETRM OR NOT a jury should be instructed, in a personal
injury case, that its verdict is exempt from federal income
taxation, has been much discussed recently.1 A most practical
element in this problem is the difference between "gross pay" and
"take-home pay" in computing the present value of fiuture earn-
ings, when estimating damages.2
The real question presented by the topic concerns impair-
ment, or deprivation, of future earning capacity. Some of the
early English cases which I shall mention considered earnings
lost between the time of injury and the time of trial, in addition
to the impairment of future earning capacity. Unfortunately, such
decisions, in some instances, fail to make clear the apparent
(more than real) distinction between the two situations.
I shall attempt to be practical, to point out how a devastat-
ing seed (from the standpoint of the plaintiff) may be planted
in the minds of the jurors, even before the first witness is sworn.
It can very well be planted by defense counsel's questions on
voir dire examination of jurors concerning the fact that plain-
tiff's recovery, under Federal laws, is not subject to the income
tax. The seed may be planted during the defense counsel's open-
ing statement. At any time during the trial the seed may be
planted; or if already planted, it may be nurtured by a statement
of defense counsel in making an objection.
The point is that today almost everybody is sensitive to taxes.
Most of the jurors are chagrined over the fact that their own
weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly paychecks are considerably de-
* Member of the firm of Kennett, McCutcheon & Soderland of Seattle,
Washington; former Chief Dep. Prosecuting Atty. of King County, Wash.;
Special Pros. Atty. Snohomish County, Wash.; President, Western Region
of NACCA; Advisory Editor of NCS (Negligence & Compensation Service);
etc.
[Editor's Note: This is the substance of an address delivered before a
national audience of attorneys in San Francisco, Calif. in Vebruary 1957.]
1 See, for example, Knachel, Jury Instructions on Tax Exemptions in Per-
sonal Injury Cases, 6 Clev. Mar. L. R. 71 (1957), citing a number of other
articles on this subject (defense attorney's view).
2 For tables and methods of computation, see Oleck, Damages to Persons
and Property, 294, 96624-966.62 (1957 revision).
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pleted before they get them, because of the deductions on behalf
of Uncle Sam- (a) the withholding for income tax, (b) the with-
holding for Social Security, and (c) in some cases, the withhold-
ing for State government for workman's compensation, medical
aid, etc.
Therefore, it should be clear that if by any means whatso-
ever, the jurors are given to understand that any amount they
award to a plaintiff is (a) free of Federal income tax, (b) free of
any deduction for Social Security, or (c) free of other deductions
for government purposes such as the jurors have to pay-they
will indeed humanly and instinctively (because jealousy is a
part of human nature) be conditioned to award to the plaintiff
something less than the present value of his impaired future
gross earnings. In short, jurors are human beings.
Under F. E. L. A., the Safety Appliance Act, the Boiler In-
spection Act, the Jones Act, State statutes dealing with wrong-
ful death, and the statutory laws of the several States with re-
spect to personal injuries resulting in impaired future earning
capacity, the plaintiff is entitled, in the case of wrongful death,
to recover the pecuniary loss resulting to decedent's statutory
beneficiaries; and, in the case of personal injury, the plaintiff is
entitled to be compensated adequately and fully for his pecuniary
loss. Of course, under the decisions, there are elements such as
(1) impaired ability to engage in recreational activities, (2) dis-
figuring and humiliating scars, (3) pain and suffering, (4) loss
of society, companionship, consortium, care; and in the case of
children as beneficiaries, the loss of guidance, instruction, etc.
These last mentioned elements, all of which, under our decisions,
necessarily have a pecuniary value, are not subjects to be cov-
ered in this discussion. The amounts to be awarded for their im-
pairment, or deprivation, are, however, closely connected, from
the standpoint of pecuniary measurement, with the subject which
I am discussing, i.e., the impairment or loss of future earning
capacity.
We all know that the principal guides available to the jury
for measuring such losses are to a great extent measured by the
decedent's or plaintiff's earnings prior to his death or injury. We
also all know that a decedent's or plaintiff's earnings prior to his
death or injury were, as between him and the United States gov-
ernment, subject to an income tax, a portion of which was regu-
larly withheld from his paycheck. We all know that there were
other regular deductions from his paycheck. Hence, defense
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counsel argues that the loss to the decedent's beneficiaries, or to
the plaintiff in case of disabling injuries, must be measured by
his "take-home" pay, rather than by his gross earnings.
At first blush, such an argument seems quite plausible. It
is an argument calculated to find immediate acceptance by jurors
who instinctively resent these deductions from their paychecks.
Therefore, the mere mention, in the presence of the jury, of the
fact that its award is tax free, or the suggestion that decedent's
or plaintiff's "take-home" pay rather than gross earnings should
be the yardstick by which impaired future earning capacity
should be measured, strikes a responsive chord in the mind of
most jurors.
As I have said, such an argument is plausible,-but, on
analysis, as will be presently demonstrated, it is totally un-
realistic, and opens the field for the wildest conjecture and
speculation concerning the future. Implicit in this defense argu-
ment, is the proposition that the defendant should 1'e given the
benefit of the taxes and other deductions which would have gone
to the United States government or to the state. It means that
the wrongdoer, who is responsible for the death or injury, claims
the benefit of those amounts which decedent or plaintiff would
have paid for taxes, and the benefit of social security deductions.
The fallacy of such an argument must be immediately ap-
parent. Yet, every day in some court in this country, some
lawyer unprepared on this subject permits this ill-founded and
fallacious thought to be planted in the minds of the laymen who
sit as jurors to determine the case.
The legal means for avoiding such an improper result have
been spelled out by all the decisions except those of the Supreme
Court of Missouri, where there are two diametrically opposed
decisions.8
Even in the absence of the decisions which I shall hereafter
mention, any plaintiff's lawyer should be able to advance the
following arguments against the right of the defense to restrict,
(a) by an instruction of the court, or (b) by argument or re-
marks in the presence of the jury, the computation of the present
worth of impaired or lost future earning capacity, to take-home
pay as distinguished from gross pay:
3 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952); Hilton v.
Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227 S. W. 2d 675 (1950). As to pleading present
value of future earnings, see, Jacobsen v. Poland, 80 N. W. 2d 891 (Nebr.
1957).
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1. A plaintiff under the doctrine of res judicata is required
to recover all of his damages in one lawsuit; therefore, if tax
rates were reduced after he recovered his judgment, he could
not return to court and ask for additional damages to compen-
sate for the change of the tax law.
2. The rate of taxation which might be imposed on future
earnings is variable and unpredictable.
3. The tax law relative to permissible exemptions and de-
ductions are subject to constant change.
4. The marital status and the number of dependents affect
an individual's tax liability, and these factors cannot be assumed
to remain changeless throughout an injured plaintiff's life ex-
pectancy.
5. The payment of income taxes is a matter between the
individual and his government, and not a concern of the wrong-
doer by which the wrongdoer can profit.
6. Wrongdoers who harm plaintiffs in the upper income tax
brackets could virtually evade liability by reason of the fact that
any award to such an injured plaintiff would represent income
already preempted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In short, such a contention by the defense has implicit in it
the wildest possible conjecture and speculation, because of the
variables which no one can predict with anything bordering on
reasonable certainty. The adoption of such a contention would
therefore grant to the defendant the means of reducing an award
by speculation and conjecture; whereas, a plaintiff must, under
the decisions of most states, prove his case with respect to future
losses by a reasonable certainty, or reasonable probability.
It has been distinctly held that it is reversible error to
advise the jury, either by an instruction or by argument, that a
personal injury award is not subject to federal income tax.4 Of
this, the oft-cited Hall case said:
"It does not necessarily follow that the argument is proper
because it correctly states the law. For if the defendant's
argument is proper on the basis that it tells the jury what
the law is then what objection can there be for plaintiff's
counsel to state that the expense of trial is not provided for
in the instruction concerning damages, that the cost of
medical witnesses is not paid by the defendant, that the ex-
pense of taking depositions, as well as court reporting at the
4 Hall v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N. E. 2d 77, 50 A. L. R.
2d 661 (1955).
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trial, must be borne by the individual litigants, that the
fees of plaintiff's attorney are not recognized as an element,
that the defendant can deduct any award it pays from its
income and excess profits tax return and that the amounts
of awards are allowed as expenses in providing for increasing
railroad fares? This could be developed ad infinitum, and
all this is the law.
"It is a general principle of law that in the trial of a
lawsuit the status of the parties is immaterial. Thus, what
the plaintiff does with an award, or how the defendant ac-
quires the money with which to pay the award, is of no
concern to the court or jury. Similarly, whether the plain-
tiff has to pay a tax on the award is a matter that concerns
only the plaintiff and the government. The tort-feasor has
no interest in such question. And if the jury were to mitigate
the damages of the plaintiff by reason of the income tax
exemption accorded him, then the very Congressional intent
of the income tax law to give an injured party a tax benefit
would be nullified."
It is proper for the trial court to receive the testimony of an
actuary concerning present value based upon the plaintiff's gross
income, and it is not error for the trial court to reject defend-
ant's offer of proof of the plaintiff's average net earnings after
deductions. 5
It is improper to get the matter of taxation before a jury
either by oral argument or written instruction, because it intro-
duces an extraneous subject, giving rise to conjecture and specu-
lation.6
In Stokes v. United States7 the court said:
"We see no error in the refusal to make a deduction for
income taxes in the estimate of libellant's expected earnings;
such deductions are too conjectural."
The early decisions on these matters came from England,
Scotland, and Canada.8
In an English case of 1949, we find the following: 9
"The amount of tax he might have to pay might differ
from year to year; but with all these things the defendants
certainly have nothing to do, and are equally certainly not
5 Hall v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., Ibid., n. 4. Stokes v. United States,
144 F. 2d 81 (CCA. 2, 1944); Majestic v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 147
F. 2d 621 (CCA. 6, 1945).
6 Hall v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., Ibid., n. 5.
7 Above, n. 5.
8 See anno., 9 A. L. R. 2d 320.
9 bid., n. 8.
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entitled to say that, as wrongdoers, they should receive an
abatement of the damages they ought to pay by deducting
tax, solely for their benefit."
In a Canadian case, the court said: 10
"The plaintiff by contract is entitled to receive a certain
wage. If, by reason of having received these wages he is
compelled to pay a certain amount for income tax, that is a
matter between him and the Crown. Regardless of the
amount of the income tax liability the plaintiff became en-
titled under his contract with his employer to receive a fixed
amount for wages. After carefully considering the matter,
I am of the opinion that in awarding compensation, the
Court is only concerned, as a guide to the amount awarded,
with the amount which the plaintiff would have earned pur-
suant to his contract with his employer. Whether or not
these earnings would or would not be subject to income tax,
is entirely outside the scope of the Court's consideration."
No deduction for income tax can be made from an award
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, on the present value of an injured employee's lost future
wages.11
Income tax liability cannot be taken into consideration as a
ground for diminishing the amount of damages for the impair-
ment of earning capacity.12
It is reversible error for defense counsel to remark in the
presence of the jury that an award to the plaintiff is not subject
to federal income tax.'3
It is prejudicial and reversible error, under F. E. L. A., for
the court to instruct the jury that plaintiff's damages are not
subject to federal income taxes.14
Inquiries at the trial into the incidence of taxation in dam-
age suits for personal injuries are not the proper subject for in-
struction or argument of counsel.15
Future tax liability is subject to too many variables to be
the matter of consideration in an award for future impairment in
earning capacity. 16
10 Ibid., n. 8.
11 Runnells v. Douglas, 124 F. Supp. 657 (Alaska, 1954).
12 O'Donnell v. Great Northern R. Co., 109 F. Supp. 590 (D. C. Calif., 1951).
13 Hall v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., above, n. 5.
14 Wagner v. Illinois C. R. Co., 7 IMI. App. 2d 745, 129 N. E. 2d 771 (1955).
15 Highshew v. Kushto, 134 N. E. 2d 555 (Ind., 1956).
16 Combs v. Chicago, etc., 135 F. Supp. 750 (D. C. Iowa, 1955).
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The trial court, in an action under F. E. L. A., did not com-
mit error in refusing defendant's requested instruction to the
effect that any amount received by the plaintiff was exempt from
federal income taxation and that the jury should consider that
fact in arriving at the amount of their verdict.17
The trial court did not commit error in rejecting evidence
of plaintiff's present income tax liability on the issue of damages
in a personal injury action, for the reason that no possible esti-
mate of future tax liability on any given income could be esti-
mated.18
The same rule applies in a death action arising out of colli-
sion between an automobile and a train at a grade crossing.19
In conclusion, I want to offer this very practical suggestion.
In a case which I concluded early this February, and in which I
received a $71,000 verdict, I had as opposition two of the ablest
defense counsel in the State of Washington. In pre-trial dis-
covery depositions, they had required the production of plain-
tiff's income tax returns. I surmised that they intended to argue
that any award for plaintiff's impairment of future earning
capacity should be based on his take-home pay.
Accordingly, I requested the judge to hold a conference in
chambers, with the court reporter present, before any prospec-
tive jurors were called into the jury box. This was granted. I
advised the judge that I suspected that defense counsel would
interrogate prospective jurors concerning their knowledge of the
difference between take-home pay as distinguished from gross
earnings. The judge immediately responded that he saw nothing
wrong with that if they did.
Fortunately, I was prepared to present to him the cases which
I have mentioned in this discussion. He was very surprised to
find that the law was as I have here stated it. When he became
convinced that my position was correct, and when defense
counsel were unable to give him any authority to the contrary,
he sustained my position and emphatically forbade counsel to
inject that issue into the case.
I tell you of this experience because you too may wish to
prevent the first seed being planted. If you neglect to do so,
17 Maus v. N. Y, Chicago, etc., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 2d 253 (1956).
18 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Pool, 263 S. W. 2d 582 (Tex., 1953).
19 Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. McFerrin, 279 S. W. 2d 410 (Tex., 1955);
Buchner & Sons v. Allen, 289 S. W. 2d 387 (Tex., 1956).
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certainly you should object the first time the matter is mentioned
before the jury, and ask that the jury be excused while you argue
your contention. However, it may be too late, because you might
have a tax-sensitive juror who grasped defense counsel's point
simply from hearing the question asked or the statement made.
It is mighty hard to unring a bell. It is my suggestion that you
don't put yourself in a position where you have to try to do
that.
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